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A PLEA FOR ADOPTION BY NORTH
CAROLINA OF THE FEDERAL
JOINDER RULES'
HENRY BRANDis, JR.*
By far the best way for North Carolina to go about reform of civil
procedure would be to endow the Supreme Court with the rule-making
power. At least it is to be hoped that a thorough-going re-examination
of the whole procedural system would ensue and that we would emerge
with a system closely resembling that provided by the Federal Rules.
However, since the General Assembly has not yet manifested a de-
sire to take this step, it is apparently still in order to consider specific
phases of procedure in the hope that improvement can be made, even
though it be recognized that such tinkering is not likely to be as suc-
cessful as an integrated revision of the system.
One such phase of civil procedure encompasses the rules governing
permissive joinder of causes and parties. The existing rules have been
examined at some length in a prior article.' It was there concluded that
the record of the North Carolina Supreme Court in interpreting the
joinder statutes shows more cases of liberal than literal construction;
but that the statutes are themselves too restrictive.
While no attempt will be made here to summarize the rules discussed
in the prior article, a few examples will serve to show the incongruous
results inherent in the present law. Though A may, in one action, sue
B for breach of two entirely independent contracts, 2 he may not, in one
action, sue B, his employer, for: (1) negligent injury and (2) wrongful
discharge arising from A's refusal to sign a release of the negligence
claim.8 A plaintiff may, in one action involving corporate mismanage-
ment, join officers and directors as defendants, though the alleged mis-
management covers a period of seven years and though it seems probable
that not all defendants served as officers or directors throughout that
period.4 But plaintiff may not join: (1) a cause against B for slander
and (2) a cause against B and three others for subsequent publication
of the same defamation. 5
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1 Brandis, Permissive roinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina (1946)
25 N. C. L. REv. 1.2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-123 (2). Followed in: Lyon v. A. C. L. R. R.,
165 N. C. 143, 81 S. E. 1 (1914) ; Robertson v. A. C. L. R. R., 148 N. C. 323, 62
S. E. 413 (1908); State ex rel. Maggett v. Roberts, 108 N. C. 174, 12 S. E. 890
(1891) ; Sutton v. McMillan, 72 N. C. 102 (1875).
'Pressley v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 226 N. C. 518, 39 S. E. (2d) 382 (1946).
'Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Peirce, 195 N. C. 717, 143 S. E. 524 (1928).
r Gattis v. Kilgo, 125 N. C. 133, 34 S. E. 246 (1899).
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It is obvious from these illustrations that the North Carolina statutes
do not draw lines based on any principle of trial convenience, though it
is equally obvious that that principle should be the controlling one in the
joinder rules. This is further illustrated by the fact that the following
sequence of events would be possible under the North Carolina rules.
A and B, riding in the same automobile, are injured by the same negli-
gent act of C. They join as plaintiffs. Upon demurrer, the action is
dismissed for misjoinder.6 They then start separate actions. Over the
defendant's protest the actions are consolidated for trial and this is a
proper order7.
Fortunately, the Federal Rules, which treat joinder primarily as a
matter-of trial convenience, are available as a working model for modern-
ization of our statutes. While they cannot be adopted verbatim, as they
would not fit into the remainder of -our statutory system, we can borrow
the principles they embody. While absolute conformity to the Rules
may not be necessary, substantial conformity is desirable; and, assum-
ing we are going to make fundamental changes in our joinder statutes,
we should be satisfied there is sound reason for, any lack of uniformity
remaining in the final product.
The remainder of this article is devoted to discussion of the changes
in the State rules which this would entail.
THE CASE INVOLVING A SINGLE PLAINTIFF AND
SINGLE DEFENDANT
Under G. S. 1-123, when A sues B he may join any number of
causes for injury to person or property, however unrelated they may be;
or he may join any number of causes for breach of contract (including
cases in which a tort theory is waived in fav6r of implied contract),8
however large a number of independent transactions are involved. How-
ever, he may not join a contract cause with a tort cause unless they
carise out of the same transaction or transaction connected with the same
subject of action." And this clause, always of uncertain meaning, is
sometimes nirrowly construed.
The principle of enumerating classes of actions and insisting that all
joined causes fall within one class has neither logic nor convenience to
recommend it. At the time G. S. 1-123 was adopted it represented a
step forward from the common law rules, but it was nevertheless in-
fluenced by the common law background of attempting to compress
joinder within the framework of the old forms of action. However,
I Though the court was passing on a different question, this is plainly stated to
be the law in Montgomery v. Blades, 217 N. C. 654, 9 S. E. (2d) 397 (1940). It
is also a necessary result of the decision in Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, 151
N. C. 97, 65 S. E. 750 (1909).
' Robinson v. Standard Transportation Co., 214 N. C. 489, 199 S. E. 725 (1938).
'Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 (1887).
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our years of experience with the one form of civil action leave little
ground for argument that, while contract and contraft or tort and tort
are compatible in a pleading or trial, contract and tort are not.
The possibility of prejudice arising from free joinder is a bugaboo
much more frequently feared than encountered; but adequate protection
against possible prejudice can be provided by giving the court power to
order separate trials of the causes originally joined. Certainly adequate
protection cannot be given simply by looking at the theories on which the
respective causes are based, and hence G. S. 1-123 currently furnishes
no real protection against the one substantial danger apprehended.
Further, it is common knowledge that a sizeable percentage of cases
never get beyond the pleading stage. If a case is settled before trial,
what difference does it make how many causes it embraced or on what
theories they were grounded?
The federal provisions place no restriction on joinder of causes when
multiple parties are not involved. Under Rule 18(a) a plaintiff "may
join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims either
legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party."
To provide the desirable escape valve, for this and related situations, it
is provided in Rule 42(b) that "the court in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim or third-party claim, or of aniy separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or
issues." These provisions- should clearly be written into the North
Carolina law.9
INCONSISTENCY
Federal Rule 8(e) (2), in addition to allowing the pleading of causes
in the alternative, allows a party to "state as many separate claims.
as he has regardless of consistency.""' This, also, should be followed
in the North Carolina statutes."1
Perhaps this would work no major change in the State situation as,
while the question is not altogether free from doubt, there are cases indi-
cating that causes, though to some extent inconsistent, can be joined at
the pleading stage.'2 But no harm can come from making the provision
See sections 3 and 12 of the proposed statute, infra note 107.
10 See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Goldberg, 143 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A.
7th, 1944), cert. den. 323 U. S. 770 (1944), rehearing den. 323 U. S. 817 (1944) ;
Israel v. Alexander, 50 F. Supp. 1007 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Cary v. Hardy, 1
F. R. D. 355 (E. D. Tenn. 1940); Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,
26 F. Supp. 715 (D. D. C. 1939); Kraus v. General Motors Corp., 27 F. Supp.
537 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Michelson v. Shell Union Oil Corp., 26 F. Supp. 594
(D. Mass. 1938); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Stueve, 25 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn.1938).
11 See section 3 of the proposed statute, infra note 107.
"'Graham v. Hoke, 219 N. C. 755, 14 S. E. (2d) 490 (1941); Shuford v.
Yarborough, 198 N. C. 5, 150 S. E. 618 (1929) ; Worth v. Knickerbocker Trust
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explicit. It might minimize any tendency to force an election between
causes at the trial,13 as such action obviously takes away much of the
advantage conferred by the pleading privilege; but the ultimate decision
as to this would be left to the court.1 4  To the court would also be left
the decision as to the effect, if any, of the new provision on the doctrine
of election of remedies.15 That doctrine, since it involves much more
than a mere question of pleading, could conceivably survive the new
provision unscathed.
Adoption of the change would strengthen the chance for effective
use of the alternative joinder provisions already existing ;, and it would
also be in line with the prevailing North Carolina rule that a defendant
may plead inconsistent defences.' 7
THE COMMON QUESTION OF LAW OR FACT RULE
When multiple plaintiffs or defendants are involved, the greatest
single stumbling block to free joinder under the present North Carolina
statutes is the requirement of G. S. 1-123 that all causes must affect
all parties. For example, it prevents an infant and his parent from
joining as plaintiffs to enforce their respective rights arising from negli-
gent injury to the infant, and likewise prevents A and B, riding in the
same car and injured by the same act of C, from joining as plaintiffs.
Common sense clearly dictates that such joinder should be permitted as
is indicated by the power given the trial court to enforce consolidation
for trial.'8
Co., 152 N. C. 242, 67 S. E. 590 (1910). See also Goodson v. Lehmon, 225 N. C.
514, 35 S. E. (2d) 623 (1945) ; Peitzman v. Town of Zebulon, 219 N. C. 473, 14
S.E. (2d) 416 (1941).
S See Brandis, supra note 1, pp. 9-10, 13-14.
a, See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Goldberg, Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Co., and Kraus v. General Motors Corp., all cited supra note 10, as indi-
cating that federal courts ordinarily will not require election. To the same effect
as to inconsistent defenses, see Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Krout, 146 F.
(2d) 531 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
" See Brandis, supra note 1, cases cited in note 51.
" See Brandis, supra note 1, pp. 4-5, 43-49.
"'Hight v. Harris, 188 N. C. 328, 124 S. E. 623 (1924) ; Dixon v. Green, 178
N. C. 205, 100 S. E. 262 (1919) (court said both defenses should go to jury) ;
Johnson v. Eversole Lumber Co., 147 N. C. 249, 60 S. E. 1129 (1908) ; McLamb
v. McPhail, 126 N. C. 218, 35 S. E. 426 (1900). See also Mull v. Walker, 100
N. C. 46, 6 S. E. 685 (1888), and the cases cited infra note 82, as to corqtingent
pleading of theoretically inconsistent defenses in the tort-feasor cases. There is
language in several cases which, taken literally, seems a denial of the right to
plead and rely on defenses which, though possibly inconsistent in legal theory, can
as a practical matter co-exist or can, in good conscience, be relied on seriatim.
See Gorham v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 214 N. C. 526, 200 S. E. 5 (1938),
petition to rehear dismissed and cert. den. 215 N. C. 195, 1 S. E. (2d) 569 (1939) ;
Higson v. North River Lumber Co., 152 N. C. 206, 67 S. E. 509 (1910) ; Fayette-
ville Waterworks Co. v. Tillinghast, 119 N. C. 343, 25 S. E. 960 (1896). The
Tillinghast case may actually stand for such a proposition, though it seems doubt-
ful; but the other two are probably to be taken only as presenting situations in
which a defendant has, by his extra-judicial conduct, lost the right to use a defense
through waiver or estoppel."' Consolidation is not an adequate substitute for joinder because: (1) It
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How far should the privilege of free joinder extend? Assuming
that it is desirable in these cases, does it follow that two plaintiffs should
be able to unite against one defendant on completely unrelated causes?
Or that a plaintiff should be able to join several defendants and make
completely unrelated claims against them? It is quite unnecessary to
extend the privilege so far, as there is nothing to be gained by doing so.
Federal Rule 20(a) provides two basic criteria: (1) claims of all
plaintiffs, and claims against all defendants, must be "in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences"; and (2) as to the plaintiffs or defendants so joined, a
"question of law or fact common to all" must be presented.19 That the
claims of different plaintiffs or the claims against different defendants
embrace different causes of action is no stumbling block under Rule
18(a), so long as these two requirements are satisfied. Any inference
that all causes must affect all parties is negatived by the provision of
Rule 20(a) that "a plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in ob-
taining or defending against all the relief demanded.
2 0
All of these provisions should be incorporated into the State law.
2 1
Together they give a much more more realistic answer than do the
present State statutes to the question: How much can conveniently be
dealt with in the trial of a single law suit? The North Carolina Supreme
Court has, in effect, recognized that a common question of law or fact
places the emphasis on separate suits with a possibility of a single trial, instead of
on single suits with a possibility of separate trials; whereas the single suit and
trial are desirable, in situations involving common questions, more often than not.
(2) Costs are greater under the consolidation procedure, without regard to the
situation on appeal. (3) It is possible that separate appeals are necessary in the
consolidated cases. The court once made it clear that if actions, though consol-
idated for trial, are such as could not have been joined in a single action originally,
they remain technically separate cases and separate records on appeal are neces-
sary. Osborne v. Town of Canton, 219 N. C. 139, 13 S. E. (2d) 265 (1941);
Williams v. C. & N. R. R., 144 N. C. 498, 57 S. E. 216 (1907). However, in
Coniey v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 224 N. C. 211, 29 S. E. (2d) 740 (1944), the
court said only one record was required. The opinion refers neither to prior
cases nor to Supreme Court Rule 19(2), dealing with multiple appeals in one
action. In this state of the cases it is very difficult to say what the law is, though
the Conley case represents the preferable rule.
"o For discussion of the background of this rule, including the experience in
England and in the states adopting the English rule, see MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrICE
(1938) §§20.01-20.03. Similar discussions of the background of the other rules
dealt with in this article will be found in the appropriate sections of the same work.
The subject is beyond the scope of this article, as is discussion of the extent to
which the Federal Rules have influenced state practice in other states.
" See Mooaz's FEDERAL PRACTICz (1938) §§20.04, 20.05.
21 See sections 1 and 2 of the proposed statute, infra note 107. The proposed
revision retains, as an alternative to the transaction clause, the present provision
of G. S. 1-68 permitting joinder of plaintiffs having an interest in the subject of
action, and applies that provision to defendants, also. In cases involving property
this should permit joinder when common questions of law or fact are presented
but it might nevertheless be difficult to justify the joinder under the transaction
clause. Compare the proposed amendment to Federal Rule 13(g), discussed in the
text and infra note 79.
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is a legitimate basis for joinder.22 It cannot be made a controlling prin-
ciple so long as G. S. 1-123 requires that all causes affect all parties;
but recognition by the court of its practicality helps lay the groundwork
for the change.
These provisions would hardly deny joinder in any case in which it
has been permitted under existing State rules. For instance, the cred-
itors' bill cases which, as a class, probably represent the extreme limit
to which the North Carolina court has gone in permitting joinder,
would still be decided the same way. If A and B sue to recover inde-
pendent claims against C, joining D upon allegations that a deed from
C to D was fraudulent and demanding that it be set aside, the alleged
fraudulent conveyance presents both: (1) a common transaction in re-
spect to which A and B make claims; and (2) common questions of law
or fact, or both. It is true that the basic claims of A and B may present
no common transaction or common question, but the rule would seem to
be satisfied, anyway. A court which has found justification for this
type of joinder under statutes much more restrictive than those pro-
posed, should have no great difficulty in continuing the practice. 24
The proposal would permit joinder in those cases, such as the parent-
child and automobile cases where it is highly desirable but not permitted
by the present State law.2 5 It would not, however, open the way for
22 Balfour Quarry Co. v. West Construction Co., 151 N. C. 345, 66 S. E. 217
(1909) ; State ex rel. Cook v. Smith, 119 N. C. 350, 25 S. E. 958 (1896) ; Pretz-
felder v. Merchants Ins. Co., 116 N. C. 491, 21 S. E. 302 (1895). The presence of
common questions has also been used to justify consolidation. Abbitt v. Gregory,
201 N. C. 577, 160 S. E. 896 (1931).
S See Brandis, suPra note 1, pp. 19-22.
"Federal Rule 18(b) expressly authorizes joinder of a demand for money
judgment with a demand to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. This is unnecessary
in North Carolina as the right is already recognized. Rule 18(b) is broader than
this, but its most important application is to the fraudulent conveyance cases. See
MooRn's FEDERAL PRAcTicE (1938) §18.03. The broader language of the rule
raises questions as to joinder of insurers, indemnitors, and persons guaranteeing
to pay in case a judgment remains unpaid. See Grier v. Tri-State Transit Co.,
36 F. Supp. 26 (W. D. La. 1940); Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp. 146 (W. D.
Mich. 1940); Jennings v. Beach, 1 F. R. D. 442 (D. Mass 1940). The rule has
not been incorporated in the proposed North Carolina statute, infra note 107.
" See, e.g., Sporia v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 143 F. (2d) 105
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1944) (car owner and passenger join for damage to car and per-
sonal injuries, respectively); Lansburgh & Bro. v. Clark, 127 F. (2d) 331 (App.
D. C. 1942) (husband and wife join for negligent injury to wife); Doyle v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 123 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) (plaintiffs severally
owning different, though adjoining, land tracts, join in suit for title and posses-
sion); Thomson v. United Glazing Co., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 527 (W. D. N. Y. 1941)
(ear driver and passenger join for respective injuries); Farmers Co-Op Oil Co.
v. Socony-Vacu m Oil Co., 133 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942), and Ala-bama Independent Service Station Ass'n., Inc. v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F.
Supp. 386 (N. D. Ala. 1939) (both allowing plaintiffs to join in suing for separate
damages caused by violation of anti-trust laws). On the defendants' side, seePsaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowner  Corp., 5 F. R. D. 398 (S. D. N. Y.
1946) (joinder of action against A under Jones Act with action against B for
common law negligence). Cf. Ginsburg v. Standard Oil Co., 5 F. R. D. 48 (5. D.
N. Y. 1945); Wilson v. Massagee, 224 N. C. 705, 32 R. E. (2d) 335, 156 A. L. R.
922 (1944).
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trial in one action of completely unrelated cases. For example, the fol-
lowing have been held not to satisfy the same transaction and common
question requirements under the Federal rules: (1) suit by single plain-
tiff against three defendants on a note and against two of the defendants
on a completely unrelated note ;26 (2) suit by multiple plaintiffs against
multiple defendants involving ten tracts of land ;27 (3) suit against (a)
C for making and selling a device infringing plaintiff's patent and M
for selling same; and (b) C for unfair competition in using deceptive
advertising and in selling at low prices to destroy plaintiff's business.
28
To avoid genuine prejudice or hardship arising from enlargement of
the joinder privilege, the provision allowing separate trials provides an
adequate escape valve.
THE VENUE PROVISIONS
The present mandate of G. S. 1-123 that joined causes shall not
require different places of trial seems not to have presented a trouble-
some problem.2 However, in revising the section, some disposition
must be made of it. The soundest provision would seem to be one stat-
ing that if causes which require different places of trial are joined, the
court shall, upon proper application as provided by the venue statutes,
divide the action and transfer the respective parts to the proper counties.30
MODIFICATION OF THE DIsMIssAL RULE
While there are a number of cases which are apparent exceptions to
them, the basic North Carolina rules on the consequences of misjoinder
are: (1) Misjoinder of parties only is not demurrable. When the ques-
tion is raised, the improperly joined party may either be let out of the
case or, though retained, treated as a surplus party whose presence is
thereafter of importance only when costs are assessed.31 (2) Misjoinder
of causes only is demurrable, but results only in division of the action.32
(3) Misjoinder of both causes and parties ig demurrable and results in
dismissal of the action.33
This last is a harsh rule and its harshness is accentuated by the rule
that after a demurrer for dual misjoinder has been sustained there can
26 Federal Housing Administrator v. Christianson, 26 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn.
1929). q
"Gerard v. Mercer, 62 F. Supp. 28 (D. Mont. 1945).
28 Man-Sew Pinking Attachment Corp. v. Chandler Mach. Co., 29 F. Supp. 480
(D. Mass. 1939). Cf. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 54 F. Supp. 514 (D.
Md. 1944), reversed on grounds not involving joinder, 149 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A.
4th, 1945). cert. den., 326 U. S. 721 (1945)."See Brandis, supra note 1, pp. 14-15.
"See section 3 of the proposed statute, infra note 7. That this is probably the
existing law is indicated by Richmond Cedar Works v. J. L. Roper Lumber Co.,
161 N. C. 604. 77 S. E. 784 (1913).
"See Brandis, supra note 1, pp. 5-7."See Brandis, supra note 1, pp. 15-16.
"See Brandis, supra note 1, pp. 49-53.
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be no amendment to eliminate the misjoinder, but dismissal follows auto-
matically.8 4 The rule lends itself to purely technical use, offering dis-.
missal as a reward for successful objection, without regard to whether
the joinder attempted would actually be prejudicial.
This rule, since it is one of long standing, is likely to carry over to
the revised provisions suggested above. The new rules would say, in
effect: (1) joinder of any and all causes is proper if the party provisions
are satisfied; and (2) joinder of parties is proper if the same transaction
and common question requirements are met. Because of this express
interdependency of the two, there is adequate basis for saying that
violation of the party provisions would constitute a violation of both.
Hence, without further changes in the statutes dismissal would still
follow unless other new provisions prevent it.
Federal Rule 21 provides that misjoinder of parties is not ground
for dismissal. Under it a party may be dropped or added or there may
be a severance as to any claim against a party. The Rules contain no
specific provision regarding the consequences of misjoinder of causes.
One would be inclined to assume that this is a deliberate omission; that
there can be no misjoinder of causes unless violation of the party pro-
visions is regarded as dual misjoinder; and that the severance and
separate trial provisions of Rules 20(b), 21 and 42(b) were designed to
furnish the answer to any type of misjoinder or confusion of issues.
However, the federal courts apparently retain the right to dismiss for
misjoinder of causes (probably meaning, in North Carolina parlance,
misjoinder of causes and parties), though they regard dismissal as war-
ranted only in an extraordinary case, with severance being the normal
solution.3 5 While this may be satisfactory for federal purposes, it is
", Grady v. Warren, 202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932). The statute (G. S.
1-131), which expressly allows application for leave to amend after demurrer has
been sustained, does not expregsly exclude demurrers for misjoinder from its pur-
view. Compare the early cases in which the court, of its own motion, gave plain-
tiff an opportunity to amend. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 96 N. C. 14, 1 S. E. 620 (1887) ;
Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 (1877). Contra: Cromartie v. Parker, 121 N. C.
198, 28 S. E. 297 (1897). In the Grady case the order sustaining the demurrer
also dismissed. However, it apparently is not permissible for the lower court to
sustain the demurrer and allow opportunity to amend before dismissing. Wingler
v. Miller, 221 N. C. 137, 19 S. E. (2d) 247 (1942) (precise point was not in-
volved, but rule announced would cover it). A misjoinder can be cured by amend-
ment made after the objection is raised but before the demurrer has bedn sus-
tained. Walker v. Standard Oil Co., 222 N. C. 607, 24 S. E. (2d) 254 (1943).
" Man-Sew Pinking Attachment Corp. v. Chandler Mach. Co., cited supra note
28; Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n., Inc. v. Shell Petroleum Corp.,
cited supra note 25; Federal Housing Administrator v. Christianson, cited supra
note 26. Compare the statement in MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTC (1938) §21.01,
"This rule on multiple parties is the only restriction upon what would otherwise
be unlimited joinder of actions and parties," with the statement in §18.02, "Rule
21 and Rule 42(b) . . . give the court such a broad discretion in shaping the
action for trial, that a court should rarely dismiss for misjoinder of actions."
And see Atlantic Lumber Corp. v. Southern Pacific Co., 2 F. R. D. 313, 314 (D.
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doubtful, because of the long history of the dismissal rule in North
Carolina, that a similar attitude can be achieved in the State practice
without express statutory provisions.
The revised State statutes should provide that, if a demurrer for mis-
joinder of causes and parties is sustained, the court shall either divide
the action or order the offending pleader to do so. In the latter event,
if the division effected fails to eliminate the misjoinder, the court may,
in its discretion, either further divide or dismiss.30 All reference to
misjoinder of causes alone can be eliminated, because there will be no
provision of the statute which creates a misjoinder of causes unless
multiple parties are involved. But if, in some unexpected case, the
court should find a misjoinder of causes without a misjoinder of parties,
it should not be difficult to reach the conclusion that division, and not
dismissal, is the maximum penalty. Like the present statute, the re-
vision will make no reference to misjoinder of parties alone.
COUNTERCLAIMS
As a corollary to the liberalization of the joinder privileges accorded
plaintiffs there should be a revision of the provisions governing counter-
claims.
In dealing with counterclaims there are two basic questions: (1)
What counterclaims must be pleaded? (2) What additional counter-
claims may be pleaded? The present North Carolina statute, G. S.
1-137, though it divides counterclaims into two classes, does not in
terms make either of them ccmpulsory. The statutory classes are:
(a) claims arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the
complaint, or connected with the subject of the action; and (b) in an
action on contract, any claim arising also on contract.
It is manifest that counterclaims authorized only by clause (b) are
not compulsory; and if North Carolina has any compulsory counter-
claims, they are to be found within class (a). The effect of our de-
cisions is to make some class (a) claims compulsory, this result being
reached by allowing plaintiff in the first suit, when made defendant in
the second suit, to plead the prior action as a bar, if it has gone to judg-
ment, or, if still pending, as valid ground for dismissal.
For example, when a surgeon has recovered from his patient for the
reasonable value of his services, the recovery is a bar to a subsequent
action by the patient for malpractice involving the same course of treat-
Ore. 1941) : "Where the claims are against the same defendant, certainly, there
can be no misjoinder of claims in a civil action."
Where division would not suffice because plaintiff has joined a defendant against
whom he cannot proceed, that -defendant will be dismissed, but not the entire
action. Jennings v. Beach, cited supra note 24.
" For these changes see sections 4 and 5 of the proposed statute, infra note
107.
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ment.U7 Similarly, when A sues B for breach of contract and, while
that action is pending, B sues A for breach of the same contract, the
latter action will usually be dismissed.88 And where A sues B for
damages arising from an automobile collision and, while that action is
pending, B sues A for damages arising from the same collision, B's suit
will be dismissed.39 In these cases the court believes that the two claims
involve virtually identical questions.
In such cases it will work no change in the North Carolina lav to
adopt Federal Rule 13(a), classifying as compulsory a counterclaim
which "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim." However, the North Carolina
court has placed considerable emphasis on the general permissive char-
acter of counterclaims, and adoption of this rule would result in shifting
some cases from the permissive to the compulsory category. 40 But,
since such cases will normally involve at least one common issue as be-
tween complaint and counterclaim, and that issue could not be reliti-
Garrett v. Kendrick, 201 N. C. 388, 160 S. E. 349 (1931).
8sJ. A. Jones Construction Co. v. Hamlet Ice Co., 190 N. C. 580, 130 S. E. 165
(1925). See also Fletcher Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 222 N. C. 87, 21 S. E. (2d)
893 (1942) ; Savage v. McGlawhorn, 199 N. C. 427, 154 S. E. 673 (1930); Bell v.
Mutual Machine Co., 150 N. C. 111, 63 S. E. 680 (1909).
" Johnson v. Smith, 215 N. C. 322, 1 S. E. (2d) 834 (1939) (potential counter-
claim was for wrongful death); Morrison v. Lewis, 197 N. C. 79, 147 S. E. 729
(1929) ; Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S. E. 545 (1919).
10 See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. McKinne, 179 N. C. 328, 102 S. E. 385 (1920).
A owned notes on which B was surety. A sued the makers, omitting B from the
suit at his request. In return, B gave a written guarantee that he would pay the
notes if judgment against the makers remained unpaid for ten days. The judg-
ment was not paid. Thereupon B sued A requesting discharge from liability on
the notes, alleging payment and unwarranted extension of time. Thereafter A
sued B on the written guarantee. Pendency of the prior action was pleaded, but
the court held that use of the claim as a counterclaim was optional. It is difficult
to see how a final decision could be reached in either of these actions without
going over much of the ground involved in the other See Cohoon v. Cooper, 186
N. C. 26, 118 S. E. 834 (1923) for a flat statement that a transaction clause
counterclaim is optional. And for other cases holding optional counterclaims
which were closely related to the subject of plaintiff's action, see Taylor v. Schaub,
225 N. C. 134, 33 S. E. (2d) 658 (1945); Thompson v. Herring, 203 N. C. 112,
164 S. E. 619 (1932); Brown v. Polk, 201 N. C. 375, 160 S. E. 357 (1931);
Mauney v. Hamilton, 132 N. C. 303, 43 S. E. 903 (1903). Compare: Wadford v.
Davis, 192 N. C. 484, 135 S. E. 353 (1926); Emry v. Chappell, 148 N. C. 327,
62 S. E. 411 (1908); Alexander v. Norwood, 118 N. C. 381, 24 S. E. 119 (1896).
In Woody v. Jordan, 69 N. C. 189 (1873), the court held that a defendant in a
replevin action did not have to counterclaim for wrongful taking of the property
in that action, but could proceed by independent action. This result might be
preserved, even under the Federal Rules, by holding that the claim for wrongful
taking does not arise out of the original transaction which is the basis of the plain-
tiff's cause. See cases cited infra note 50. A defendant in claim and delivery is
permitted to use such a claim as a counterclaim, without regard to its non-
existence at the commencement of plaintiff's action, by virtue of G. S. 1-230. In
fact, he can probably recover his damages without formal counterclaim. Ludwick
v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104, 73 S. E. 228 (1911). For defendant's rights in similar
situations involved in attachment, injunction, and arrest and bail proceedings, see
McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1929)
§467.
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gated even if separate suits were allowed, it is better to settle the whole
matter in one action.41 Concededly, it may be difficult to determine in
advance in all cases whether a counterclaim is a compulsory one. That,
however, is equally true under the present law. Defense attorneys under
either rule must resolve doubts in favor of pleading the counterclaim.
42
In concluding the subject of compulsory counterclaims, two things
should be noted: (1) Federal Rule 13(a) does not make a counterclaim
compulsory if it requires for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Cases involving appli-
cation of this will be rare, and the result could easily be reached without
the express provision, but its inclusion can do no harm. (2) For State
purposes a further provision is needed to the effect that a counterclaim
is not compulsory if the relief sought would not be within the jurisdis-
tion of the court in which the action is pending. This would take care
of the problem, already inherent in the present law, which arises from
the limited jurisdiction of inferior courts, notably the courts of justices
of the peace.
43
As for permissive counterclaims, under the North Carolina law there
can be no tort counterclaim to either a tort or contract action unless the
transaction clause is satisfied. In view of the fact that even under the
present version of G. S. 1-123 a plaintiff may join independent tort
claims against a single defendant, it is obvious that trial convenience
"I The suggested provision as to compulsory counterclaims is in section 7 (sub-
sec. 1 of revised G. S. 1-137) of the proposed statute, infra note 107. The wording
departs from that of the current version of Federal Rule 13(a) in dealing with
the exception for claims which are already the subject of a pending action. The
change is made, as a matter of clarification, in the Report of Proposed Amend-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States
(U. S. Gov't. Printing Office, June, 1946), prepared by the Advisory Committee
on Rules for Civil Procedure. The Report's Note to Rule 13 fully explains why
the clarification is desirable. The changes recommended by the Report have not
yet become operative, but are currently pending before Congress. See 6 F. R. D.
229 (1947).
" For fedeial cases dealing with compulsory counterclaims, see Moore v. New
York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 (1926) ; Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil
Products Co., 115 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940); King v. Edward B. Marks
Music Corp., 56 F. Supp. 446 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Musante-
Phillips, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 340 (N. D. Calif. 1941).
" See McINTosH, op. cit. supra note 40, §469. See also Leonard v. Coble, 222
N. C. 552, 23 S. E. (2d) 841 (1943) ; Perry v. Pulley, 206 N. C. 701, 175 S. E.
89 (1934); Stacey Cheese Co. v. Pipkin, 155 N. C. 394, 71 S. E. 442 (1911);
W. C. Heyser & Co. v. Gunter, 118 N. C. 964, 24 S. E. 712 (1896); Ijames v.
McClamroch, 92 N. C. 362 (1885). The suggested provision is in section 7 (sub-
sec. 1 of revised G. S. 1-137) of the proposed statute, infra note 107. A strong
argument can be made that it does not go far enough and that, as applied,.to
counterclaims in cases appealed to superior court for trial de novo, the doctrine of
derivative jurisdiction should be scrapped and defendant allowed to plead any
counterclaim he could have used had the action been commenced in superior court.
The converse of this situation is not troublesome, as a defendant in action
brought in superior, court may plead a counterclaim which, if made the subject
of an independent action, would have to be brought in a justice of the peace court
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Burger, 181 N. C. 241, 107 S. E. 14 (1921).
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does not require that the counterclaim privilege be so restricted. This
discrimination against defendants would be even greater if the plaintiff's
joinder privileges were enlarged without revision of the permissive
counterclaim provisions.
The question of how much can conveniently be packaged in one suit
will not be serisibly answered by making the answer turn on whether
tort or contract theories are involved, especially since in some cases either
could be used.44 The practical answer is to follow Federal Rule 13(b),
which permits a defendant to plead any claim he has against the plain-
tiff.45 The provision allowing the court to order separate trials again
furnishes such safeguard as is necessary.
One further problem in connection with counterclaims needs to be
considered. At present, G. S. 1-137 requires, as to contract clause
counterclaims, that they be in existence at the commencement of the
action. In the case of Smith v. French,46 the court, expressly departing
from any contrary implication in prior cases, ruled that a transaction
clause counterclaim does not have to be in existence at the commence-
ment of plaintiff's action. Though at least one subsequent case states a
flatly contradictory view,4T and though one recent case expresses doubt
about the rule,4 8 the cases which dearly involve such counterclaims have
followed Smith v. French.49 The cases casting doubt on the rule are
primarily those in which the counterclaim is grounded on something
done in the pending action, and they have thus not been treated as true
transaction clause counterclaims." They are distinguishable and should
" It has been held that if the complaint is grounded on a tort theory a contract
counterclaim not under the transaction clause cannot be pleaded, even though the
facts alleged in the complaint would also justify use of a contract theory. Smith
v. Young Bros., 109 N. C. 224, 13 S. E. 735 (1891). If, on the other hand, the
complaint is in contract, a defendant having a counterclaim which could be grounded
in tort may make it proper by waiving the tort and proceeding on a contract
theory. Shell v. Aiken, 155 N. C. 212, 71 S. E. 230 (1911).
" See section 7 (subsec. 2 of revised G. S. 1-137) of the proposed statute, infra
note 107. An action is not res judicata of a claim which could have been used as
a permissive counterclaim therein, but was not. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944), rehearing den., 321 U. S. 802 (1944),
imotion to clarify and correct the opinion and mandates den., 323 U. S. 672 (1944).
46141 N. C. 1. 53 S. E. 435 (1906).
" Cohoon v. Cooper, cited supra note 40. The point was not actually involved
in the case.
41 Manufacturers and Jobbers Finance Corp. v. Lane, 221 N. C. 189, 19 S. E.
(2d) 849 (1942).
"'Johnson v. Smith, cited supra note 39 (where, in an accident case, A sued B
and, while that action was pending, B died and his administratrix was substituted,
action by administratrix against A for wrongful death was required to be by
counterclaim) ; Gatewood v. Fry, 183 N. C. 415, 111 S. E. 712 (1922) (court said
since counterclaim was under transaction clause, damages could be allowed to time
of trial) ; Slaughter v. Standard Machine Co., 148 N. C. 471, 62 S. E. 599 (1908)
(counterclaim not maturing until after action begun allowed). Cf. Nassaney v.
Cutler, 224 N. C. 323, 30 S. E. (2d) 226 (1944), permitting plaintiff to introduce
allegations concerning events related to original cause of action but occurring
after action brought. See also N. C. GEN. STAT (1943) §1-167.
" See, e.g., Manufacturers and Jobbers Finance Corp. v. Lane, cited supra note
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not be allowed to break down the well-considered rule of Smith v.
French.
The strongest reason advanced for the requirement that a counter-
claim exist at the commencement of the action is that it is bad policy
to permit a defendant to offset plaintiff's claim by purchasing claims
after the action is brought.51 This obviously has little, if any bearing
on claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence set forth in the
complaint. As to these, Federal Rule 13(a) seems clearly correct in
treating those coming into existence at any time before the answer is
filed5 2 on the same basis as those existing at the commencement of the
action. Further, there is no sound policy objection to allowing such a
counterclaim to be interposed by supplemental pleading, with the per-
mission of the court, though it arises after the answer is filed. This is
the provision of Federal Rule 13(e) and it should be followed in the
State practice, though occasions for its used as to this type of counter-
claim will obviously be rare.53
Even as to counterclaims of the permissive type, it is rather question-
able to require that they be in existence at the commencement of the
action. If the provision operates to shut off claims, as on notes, which
do not mature until after the commencement of the action,54 even though
acquired before that time, it obviously shuts off claims not within the
supposed reason for the policy. Similarly if, after action commenced,
plaintiff breaches a contract with defendant (not involved in the plain-
tiff's action but in existence at the commencement thereof), should de-
fendant not be permitted to use it as a counterclaim?
Certainly the wisdom of the present policy is sufficiently open to
question to indicate that it should not be retained at the expense of
conformity with the Federal Rules. Accordingly, the federal provision,
allowing use of claims acquired before answer filed, should be written
48 (counterclaim based on plaintiff's wrongful prosecution of the pending action-
i.e., either abuse of process or malicious prosecution, probably the latter) ; Godwin
v. Kennedy, 196 N. C. 244, 145 S. E. 229 (1928) (counterclaim for assault and
false arrest by officer who served claim and delivery papers in pending action).
In Smith v. French, cited supra note 46, the counterclaim involved seizure of
property in the pending action, but under the particular circumstances the court
held it to be a transaction clause counterclaim. See also citations supra note 40,
as to special situations involved in claim and delivery, attachment, injunction, and
arrest and bail proceedings.
" Smith v. French, cited supra note 46.
2 An amendment to this provision, proposed by the report cited supra note 41,
would make the serving rather than the filing of the answer the determinative time.
This is to harmonize the provision with the rest of the Rules. Since in State
practice, under G. S. 1-240, failure to serve simply excuses plaintiff from reply-
ing, the time of. filing is more appropriate.
"' See section 7 (subsec. 1 of revised G. S: 1-137) of the proposed statute, infra
note 107. Smith v. French, cited supra note 46, recognizes that a transaction clause
counterclaim may be pleaded even though not coming into existence until after
the original answer is filed.
"' See M cINTosH, op. cit. supra note 40, §467.
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into the North Carolina law55 as should the further provision of Rule
13(e) that "a claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader
after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be
presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading."5 The effect is to
treat compulsory and permissive counterclaims on the same basis for
this purpose. It should be kept in mind that these changes are pro-
cedural and would not affect such matters of substantive law as the
rules governing the right of set-off when one of the parties is insolvent.
COUNTERCLAIM IN REPLY
Federal Rules 13(a) and 13(b) are so drawn that they apparently
apply the same rule to replies as to answers and Rule 18(a) refers to
"a reply setting forth a counterclaim." Thus a reply to a counterclaim
might itself contain either a compulsory or a permissive counterclaim.5 7
By contrast, the State statutes do not expressly deal with the matter;
and it has been held that there can be no counterclaim in a reply. 8 How-
ever, there may be more form than substance involved, as the court will
"' The adoption of this rule would not oen the way to pleading of a claim
which could not arise until plaintiff's action has terminated-for example, a
counterclaim for malicious prosecution of the pending action. See Manufacturers
afid Jobbers Finance Corp. v. Lane, cited supra note 48. And see, denying right
to counterclaim in comparable situations under the Federal Rules, Park Bridge
Corp. v. Elias, 3 F. R. D. 94 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) (malicious prosecution); Men-
nen Co. v. Krauss Co., 37 F. Supp. 161 (E. D. La. 1941), rev. on other grounds,
134 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943) (libel in complaint); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Marbo Corp., 32 F. Supp. 279 (D. Del. 1940) (damages from
preliminary injunction still in force).
"This provision will be found in sectibn 7 (subsec. 2 of revised G. S. 1-137)
of the proposed statute, infra note 107, though filing has been substituted for serv-
itg for the reasons set forth in note 52. Omitted from the proposed statute are
the provisions of Federal Rule 13(f) to the effect that the court may allow amend-
ment to plead a counterclaim not originally pleaded through oversight, inadvert-
ence, or excusable neglect, or when justice so requires. It is believed that the
existing amendment power in North Carolina is adequate to permit this. See
N. C. GE. STAT. (1943) §§1-161, 1-163. The court has construed the amendment
power very broadly.
" MooR's FDERAL PRAcTicE (1938) §13.01, expresses a belief that plaintiff has
no right to plead, in his reply, a cofnterclaim unrelated to the claims already in
the case. However, the language of the rules is certainly broad enough to permit
it, and several cases seem to have recognized the right. Bethlehem Fabricators,
Inc. v. John Bown Co., 1 F. R. D. 274 (D. Mass. 1940); Warren v. Indian Re-
fining Co., 30 F. Supp. 281 (N. D. Ind. 1939). Contra: Cornell v. Chase Brass
& Copper Co., 48 F. Supp. 979 (S. D. N. Y. 1943), aff'd. without reference to this
point, 142 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) (though, under circumstances, counter-
claim in reply was treated as amendment to complaint).
. 58Boyett v. Vaughan, 85 N. C. 363 (1881). This decision, by a unanimous
court, came on rehearing after the court, in a three to two decision, -had held to
the contrary. It is cited with approval in the concurring opinion of two justices,
who apparently believed the other justices were not following it, in W. C. Heyser
& Co. v. Gunter, cited supra note 43. In Scott v. Bryan, 96 N. C. 289, 3 S. E. 235
.(1887), the court recognized the rule but refused to apply it because the reply had
been pending a long time before the objection was made. On the general topic
of counterclaims in replies, see Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 564.
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apparently allow the same result to be reached by amendment to the
complaint.5
The main reason given for denying the right to counterclaim to a
counterclaim is that the process might go on forever.60 Presumably, if
the matter is handled by amendment, this unhappy result can be avoided
because the court can deny permission to amend. However, compulsory
counterclaims should be included in replies without the necessity of
asking permission to amend. They could not bring on interminable
pleadings. Suppose, as is possible under the present law, A sues B on
a note and B counterclaims for breach by A of an independent contract.
If B had sued separately on the contract and A wished to assert a claim
for breach of the same contract by B, he would have to do so by counter-
claim.61 Presumably the same doctrine applies when B elects to pro-
ceed by counterclaim. In such a case it is hardly feasible to apply the
usual rule that amendments to the complaint after answer filed are dis-
cretionary with the court,6 2 and if discretion is not to be exercised the
application for leave to amend is a useless formality. Accordingly, it
seems advisable to follow the Federal Rules in so far as compulsory
counterclaims in replies are concerned.63 A responsive pleading to such
a counterclaim in a reply need be required only if ordered by the court,
64
as responsive pleadings to this type of counterclaim often do little to
sharpen the issues, being composed primarily of denials and repetitions
of allegations contained in former pleadings.
On the other hand, if plaintiff wishes to introduce a permissive
counterclaim, since he voluntarily passed up an opportunity to include
it in his original complaint, and since the pending action cannot prej-
udice his right to proceed on it independently, there is no injustice in
requiring him to secure the court's permission to plead it by amendment,
as distinguished from introducing it in his reply as a matter of right.
The revised North Carolina rules would, therefore, at most differ from
the Federal Rules in requiring court approval before plaintiff could in-
troduce a new claim after answer has been filed.6 5 As between a rule
of right and a rule of discretion the latter seems definitely preferable.
59Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 198 N. C. 339, 151 S. E. 626 (1930) ; W. C.
Heyser & Co., cited supra notes 43 and 58 (concurring opinion) ; Scott v. Bryan,
cited supra note 58.
"' Boyett v. Vaughan, cited supra note 58.
:'j. A. Jones Construction Co. v. Hamlet Ice Co., cited supra note 38.
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§1-161, 1-163; McINTosH, op. cit. supra note 40,
§§484, 485.
" See section 9 of the proposed statute, infra note 107.
, See section 10 of the proposed statute, infra note 107. The Federal Rules
contain no express provision authorizing such a pleading to be ordered, but it
seems desirable to give the court this discretion, as it may be useful in unusual
'. This proposed State rule would conform to the belief expressed in Mooa's
FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) §13.01, as to what federal practice ought to be. Accord:
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CROSS-CLAIMS
While the North Carolina Supreme Court has long recognized the
right to cross-claim against a co-party, under proper circumstances, the
pleading aspects of the matter are nowhere spelled out in the statute.
The only general provision is found in G. S. 1-222, to the effect that a
"judgment.. . may determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each
side, as between themselves."
Under this and the cases it is reasonably clear that if A sues B and
C, alleging that both are liable to him, and, under the substantive law,
B would have a claim against C for all or part of any amount he is com-
pelled to pay A, he may cross-claim against C for such amount (on a
contingent basis if he so desires) and have the whole matter settled in
one action. Thus, where A sues B and C, tort-feasors, and both might
be liable to A, but as between themselves their liability is primary (C)
and secondary (B), B may cross-claim for the full amount which A may
recover against him.66 Presumably the same rule would apply to permit
a surety to cross-claim against a co-defendant principal ;67 and possibly
to allow the maker of a note, sued jointly with the endorser, to cross-
claim on allegations that he made a payment to the endorser, while the
latter held the note, which was not credited by the endorser prior to
his negotiation of the note to the plaintiff.68
Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper Co., cited supra note 57. Bethlehem Fabricators,
Inc. v. John Bowen Co., cited supra note 57, expresses a preference for this
procedure.
"' Williams v. Charles Stores Co., Inc., 209 N. C. 591, 184 S. E. 496 (1936);
Johnson v. City of Asheville, 196 N. C. 550, 146 S. E. 229 °(1929) ; Bowman v.
City of Greensboro, 190 N. C. 611, 130 S. E. 502 (1925); Guthrie v. City of
Durham, 168 N. C. 573, 84 S. E. 859 (1915) ; Gregg v. City.of Wilmington, 155
N. C. 18, 70 S. E. 1070 (1911). The opinion in the Gregg case indicates that the
rule would extend to master-servant cases.
"' Saieed v. Abeyounis, 217 N. C. 644, 9 S. E. (2d) 399 (1940), indicates that a
surety paying a judgment against him and his principal is entitled to have the
judgment assigned to a trustee under G. S. 1-240 and proceed on it against the
principal; though if he allows the judgment to be satisfied he becomes a simple
contract creditor of the principal. Cf. G. S. 26-11, providing that a surety may
have a judgment cancelled as to him without it operating as cancellation against
a co-defendant principal or surety. Strict adherence to the G. S. 1-240 procedure
would seem to give the surety adequate protection, without a cross-claim, except:
(1) under Sinith v. Kappas, cited infra note 69, it will not prevent plaintiff from
taking a voluntary nonsuit against the principal prior to verdict; and (2) it will
not settle an existing dispute between defendants as to whether either of them is
a surety instead of a principal. Under G. S. 26-1 and 26-2 an issue can be sub-
mitted to determine which defendants are principals and which sureties, but this is
simply a basis for requiring that execution first issue against the principals. See
also G. S. 26-3 (summary proceeding by surety against principal) and 26-5
(actions for contribution among sureties). Wherever there is an argument over
the status of a defendant as principal or surety, a formal cross-claim by the self-
styled surety is the best way to dispose of all phases of the case at one trial. This
would seem to be permitted by Parrish v. Graham, 129 N. C. 230, 39 S. E. 825
(1901), where the court reversed the trial judge for refusing to submit an issue
as to whether one defendant was a supplemental surety to another defendant.
The ruling was justified by general equity powers and what is now G. S. 1-222." Hulbert v. Douglas, 94 N. C. 128 (1886), involved these facts, but, as the
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Where two defendants originally joined as such by plaintiff, are
true joint tort-feasors, entitled to contribution as between themselves,
either may cross-claim for contribution under G. S. 1-240, though the
cross-claim is ordinarily unnecessary because the section provides a
procedure by which one paying a disproportionate share of the judg-
ment may have it assigned to a trustee and enforce contribution without
having made a formal cross-claim. (A formal cross-claim in such a
case will, however, prevent the plaintiff from letting the co-defendant
out of the case by taking a voluntary nonsuit against him.) 69 This
assignment procedure of G. S. 1-240 also applies to joint obligors.
70
In the case of joint tort-feasors, joint obligors, or defendants who
as between themselves are primarily and secondarily liable to plaintiff, a
cross-claim seeking to adjust the rights of the defendants is clearly
"germane" to plaintiff's cause of action-i.e., the cross-claim is in ref-
erence to the claim made by plaintiff and based upon an adjustment of
that claim. Any other cross-claim, to be allowable, must also satisfy
that requirement, as it is a general one enforced by our court.
71
Some of the cases have not enforced the rule literally. Thus, where
the surety of an administrator, who had been compelled to pay part of
a judgment against the administrator, was suing distributees to recover
his payment, and it appeared that one of the defendants was also a
surety who had paid part of the judgment, the court gave the latter a
judgment against his co-defetidants. 72 And where a junior mortgagee
had foreclosed and applied the excess sale price to the senior mortgage,
propriety of the cross-claim did not have to be passed upon, the opinion is
inconclusive.
11 Smith v. Kappas, 218 N. C. 758, 12 S. E. (2d) 693 (1941), same case on
rehearing, 219 N. C. 850, 15 S. E. (2d) 375 (1941). See also Perry v. Sikes, 215
N. C. 39, 200 S. E. 923 (1939).
"0 See Fowle v. McLean, 168 N. C. 537, 84 S. E. 852 (1915). Cf. Hughes v.
Boone, 81 N. C. 204 (1879). See also N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §26-5.
" Schnepp v. Richardson, 222 N. C. 228, 22 S. E. (2d) 555 (1942) ; Bost v.
Metcalfe, 219 N. C. 607, 14 S. E. (2d) 548 (1941); Montgomery v. Blades, 217
N. C. 654, 9 S. E. (2d) 397 (1940) ; Coulter v. Wilson, 171 N. C. 537, 88 S. E.
857 (1916); Gibson v. Barbour, 100 N. C. 192, 6 S. E. 766 (1888); Hulbert v.
Douglas, cited supra note 68. The Schnepp and Bost cases also stand for the propo-
sition that cross-claims, or cross-claims combined with counterclaims, must satisfy
the requirement of G. S. 1-123 that all causes affect all parties. To the same effect
are Beam v. Wright, 222 N. C. 174, 22 S. E. (2d) 270 (1942) ; Wingler v. Miller,
cited supra note 34; Shemwell v. Lethco, 198 N. C. 346, 151 S. E. 729 (1930);
Citizens National Bank v. Angelo Brothers, 193 N. C. 576, 137 S. E. 705 (1927);
Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., 182 N. C. 107, 108 S. E. 389
(1921). Cf., holding the requirement satisfied, Taylor v. Postal Life Ins. Co.,
182 N. C. 120, 108 S. E. 502 (1921). This latter rule would become obsolete if the
changes already suggested in this article are adopted, as the controlling provision
of G. S. 1-123 would be eliminated. However, that, standing alone, probably
would not change the "germane' rule, because, while the court has sometimes dealt
with the two rules as if they amounted to the same thing, some of the cases en-
force the "germane" rule without reference to G. S. 1-123.
"2 Clark v. Williams, 70 N. C. 679 (1874). Cf. Davis v. Industrial Manufactur-
ing Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19 S. E. 371 (1894).
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when the purchaser sued for possession, and the mortgagor had the
junior mortgagee joined as a defendant, the court in giving judgment
for plaintiff, also gave the mortgagor a judgment against the junior
mortgagee for the excess of the sale price over the aniount of the junior
mortgage.13 The first of these cases hardly satisfies the requirement
stressed in later cases that the cross-claim be an adjustment of liabil-
ities stemming from plaintiff's claim. The second, from the practical
if not from the technical standpoint, possibly does satisfy it.
7 4
On the other hand, when A sues B and C for negligent injury in an
automobile accident, our court, when B objected, has denied C the right
to cross-claim against B for C's personal injuries suffered in the same
accident.7 5 In a prior case, when A sued B alone, and B had C brought
in as a potential joint tort-feasor, C was allowed, over B's protest, to
make such a cross-claim.7 6 The later case distinguished this solely on
the basis that B, having brought C in, was responsible for his predica-
ment and could not object. It is obvious that there is no difference
between the two cases with respect either to trial convenience or to
whether C's claim is germane to plaintiff's cause of action. It is prob-
lematical, therefore, whether both results will continue to be accepted,
even in the absence of statutory change. It seems particularly likely that
the court might reject the cross-claim, even when the cross-claimant is
brought in by the original defendant, if the objection comes from the
plaintiff.
By comparison, Federal Rule 13 (g) provides: "A pleading may state
as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include a
claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to
the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against
the cross-claimant."
77
" Bobbitt v. Stanton, 120 N. C. 253, 26 S. E. 817 (1897). Cf. Gurganus v.
McLawhorn, 212 N. C. 397, 193 S. E. 844 (1937) (in proceeding by creditors to
compel executor to sell land, widow and devisees cross-claim against executor,
alleging personalty sufficient if properly administered).
Another case satisfying it is Willianr v. Dixie Chevrolet Co., 209 N. C. 29,
182 S. E. 719 (1935). When the purchaser of an automobile sued his vendor, the
vendor's dealer, and the manufacturer, the court held that, if the car was unfit for
the purpose for which intended, the purchaser could recover from the vendor, and
the latter could recover over against the dealer "or" manufacturer, without ref-
erence to the breach of warranty theory on which the vendor had been given judg-
ment on his cross-claim below. Cf. Aldridge Motors, Inc. v. Alexander, 217 N. C.
750, 9 S. E. (2d) 469 (1940). In any case in which, under the principle of
Winders v. Southerland, 174 N. C. 235, 93 S. E. 726 (1917), plaintiff could join
as defendants successive warrantors in a chain of title, it would seem appropriate
to allow a defendant to cross-claim against co-defendants whose warranties ante-
date his for any substantive rights he may have against them by virtue of plain-
tiff's action.
Montgomery v. Blades, cited supra note 71.
Powell v. Smith, 216 N. C. 242, 4 S. E. (2d) 524 (1939).
"See John R. Alley & Co., Inc. v. Federal National Bank, 124 F. (2d) 995
(C. C. A. 10th, 1942).
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The pending amendments to the Federal Rules will expand this to
permit a cross-claim "relating to any property that is the subject matter
of the original action." This is "to care for a situation such as where
a second mortgagee is made defendant in a foreclosure proceeding and
wishes to file a cross-complaint against the mortgagor in order to secure
a personal judgment for the indebtedness and foreclose his lien. A claim
of this sort by the second mortgagee may not necessarily arise out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original
action under the terms of Rule 13 (g). ' 17 The desirability of permitting
this type of cross-claim is obvious." The substance of the Federal
Rule, including the pending amendment, should be adopted in North
Carolina.s°
THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
Of course, North Carolina permits new parties to be brought into a
case, and in some respects its practice is very liberal.8 ' Under the
express provisions of G. S. 1-240 a defendant may bring in one he
alleges is a joint tort-feasor with him and liable to him for contribu-
tion.82 But even before enactment of that provision (prior to which
" Report, cited supra note 41, Rule 13 (g) and note thereto.
, It is probable that North Carolina would now permit the cross-claim by the
second mortgagee in the example given in the quotation. Mortgage foreclosure
actions are expressly excepted from the requirement of G. S. 1-123 that all causes
must affect all parties, and several mortgagees may join as plaintiffs to foreclose.
McINTosH, op. cit. supra note 40, §233. Cf. Bobbitt v. Stanton, cited supra note
73, where the cross-claim allowed would fit the language of the revised Rule,
though it was not for foreclosure. In Johnston County v. Ellis, 226 N. C. 268, 38
S. E. (2d) 31 (1946), the court held void a judgment foreclosing a mortgage in
favor of a defendant who had intervened in a tax foreclosure action. However,
in addition to being a tax case, the case contained numerous other complications.
Cf. Holt v. Lynch, 201 N. C. 404, 160 S. E. 469 (1931).
" See section 7 (subsec. 3 of revised G. S. 1-137) of the proposed statute, infra
note 107. In the interest of standardization of terminology, this provision, like the
discussion in this article, uses the term "cross-claim" as used in the Federal Rules,
though "cross-action"' and "cross-complaint" have been more frequently used in
the North Carolina cases (where they are also applied, at times, to counterclaims).
"1 See N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§1-73, 1-163; McINTosH, op. cit. supra note
40, §259.
"Statutory procedure followed in: Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N. C.
647, 27 S. E. (2d) 736, 149 A. L. R. 1183 (1943) (also holding that the new
defendant can be brought in by the original defendant in a wrongful death action,
even though more than a year had elapsed from date of death and any action
plaintiff might have maintained against the new defendant had lapsed) ; Lackey v.
Southern Ry., 219 N. C. 195, 13 S. E. (2d) 234 (1941); Freeman v. Thompson,
216 N. C. 484, 5 S. E. (2d) 434 (1939) ; Mangum v. Southern Ry., 210 N. C. 134,
185 S. E. 644 (1936). These cases show it customary to make the claim on a con-
tingent basis-i.e., the original defendant: (1) denies his negligence; (2) alleges
plaintiff's injury was caused solely by the negligence of X; (3) alleges that, if
defendant is found liable to plaintiff, X's negligence concurred with his in pro-
ducing plaintiff's injury and he is entitled to judgment against X for contribution.
If the allegation fails to show that original and prospective defendants could be
joint tort-feasors, the latter cannot be brought in by the former. Bost v. Met-
calfe, cited supra note 71. Nor can he be brought in when the prospective de-
fendant's negligence would be attributable to plaintiff and bar plaintiff's action,
Evans v. Johnson, 225 N. C. 238, 34 S. E. (2d) 73 (1945) ; or when there is no
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there was no contribution between joint tort-feasors), the court had
permitted a defendant tort-feasor to bring in another tort-feasor alleged
to be primarily liable and demand judgment over against him for the
full amount recovered by plaintiff against the original defendant.83 The
same principle should authorize a defendant in a contract suit, believing
himself to be only secondarily liable, to bring in one he alleges is pri-
marily liable.M And, while G. S. 1-240 does not expressly authorize a
defendant obligor to bring in his joint obligor, there would seem to be no
valid objection to allowing a principal debtor to bring in his co-principal
or a surety his co-surety, as a basis for a demand for contribution.
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In all these situations the third-party defendant is one who could
be liable to plaintiff if plaintiff chose to make a timely assertion of
rights against him, and plaintiff could have joined him as an original
defendant. There is thus no question but that the cross-claim is "ger-
mane" to plaintiff's cause.
8 6
right of contribution because: original defendant's liability arises under the State
wrongful death statute and that of the prospective defendant under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, Wilson v. Massagee, cited =pra note 25; or the Work-
mens' Compensation remedy against the prospective defendant is exclusive, Brown
v. Southern Ry., 202 N. C. 256, 162 S. E. 613 (1932); or the law of the state
where the accident occurred gives no right of contribution, Charnock v. Taylor,
223 N. C. 360, 26 S. E. (2d) 911, 148 A. L. R. 1126 (1943).
" Bowman v. City of Greensboro and Guthrie v. City of Durham, both cited
supra note 66. The risk involved in waiting to proceed by independent action is
illustrated by City of Charlotte v. Cole, 223 N. C. 106, 25 S. E. (2d) 407 (1943),
commented on in (1944) 22 N. C. L. Rxv. 167. In both primary-secondary liability
and contribution cases the court has treated the bringing in of the new party as a
matter of right. Bowman v. City of Greensboro, supra; Freeman v. Thompson,
cited .rupra note 82. The usual North Carolina rule is that bringing in of a proper,
as distinguished from a necessary party, is within the court's discretion. Mc-
INTosH, op. cit. supra note 40, §259. This rule of discretion is also the federal rule
as to third-party defendants. MooREs FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) §14.02. Further,
a refusal to join a third-party defendant is not a final judgment and hence is not
subject to immediate appeal in federal court. B. & 0. R. R. v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 154 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 4th, 1946).
8 See, however, National Bank of Virginia v. Carr, 121 N. C. 113, 28 S. E.
186 (1897), where the court, in a suit on a note, refused to bring in the maker
and co-endorser at the request of defendant endorser. However, it does not appear
that moving defendant demanded any relief against them, the motion apparently
having been grounded on the argument that they were necessary parties. Under
G. S. 1-71 and 1-72, it is plain that ordinarily they are not. Cf. Castelberry v.
Sasser, 210 N. C. 576, 187 S. E. 761 (1936).
8" See Gill v. Young, 82 N. C. 273 (1880), holding, under the particular cir-
cumstances, that in an action by creditors against principal and surety, the admin-
istrator of deceased co-surety was a necessary party. Cf. cases cited supra note 84.
"0Compare Sutton v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 209 N. C. 826, 184 S. E. 821
(1936). Plaintiff, having two fire policies issued by different companies on the
same property, sued on one and recovered. After judgment, defendant had the
other company brought in, asking for recovery of one-half the judgment. The
third-party defendant demurred to the merits and thus waived objection to the
procedure followed. See also Joyner v. Champion Fibre Co., 178 N. C. 634, 101
S. E. 373 (1919). In this type of case, from the standpoint of trial convenience,
there is usually little to be gained by bringing in the third party after judgment,
as he is not bound by the judgment and any new trial required will differ little
from one in an independent action. Had the second company been brought in
before judgment, it probably would have been proper procedure. See Pretzfelder
v. Merchants Ins. Co., cited supra note 22.
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On the other hand, when plaintiff property owner sued defendant
building contractor, alleging that defendant used defective lumber and
fraudently concealed such use, the court denied the defendant the right
to bring in his vendor on allegations that, if the lumber was defective,
the vendor fraudulently concealed it from defendant.87  The result of
this case is probably correct if it be assumed that plaintiff (who had
probably accepted the building after inspection) could recover from the
contractor only by proving fraudulent concealment. In that event, the
only theory on which the contractor could lose would be one which
would preclude his recovery on the cross-claim, at least on the theory
alleged therein, because it would show such knowledge on his part as to
indicate there was no concealment from him. However, the decision
was not rested on that ground, but on lack of privity between plaintiff
and vendor,8  and on the fact that contractor and vendor could not be
joint tort-feasors.
In another case plaintiff was suing a bank to recover money paid by
the bank on plaintiff's check after notice to stop payment. The bank
had the payee made a party, but plaintiff refused to make a claim against
him and he was dismissed. The appeal from this ruling was also dis-
missed, the opinion rather indicating that it would never be proper to
make a third-party claim in this situation.8 9 If it does mean this it
seems to take a more narrow viewpoint than sbme of the other cases,
at least if it be assumed that plaintiff may have had rights against the
third-party defendant had he chosen to assert them.
In general the North Carolina cases make it very doubtful that a
third-party defendant can be brought in, over proper objection, on a
"7 Board of Education v. Deitrick, 221 N. C. 38, 18 S. E. (2d) 704 (1942). Cf.
Beam v. Wright and Citizens National Bank v. Angelo Brothers, both cited supra
note 71.
as See also Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., cited supri note
71; Lamson Co., Inc. v. Morehead, 199 N. C. 164, 154 S. E. 50 (1930). In the Rose
case a contractor sued the owner for the balance of the contract price of a building.
The owner brought in the architect and counterclaimed and cross-claimed, alleging
that the contractor's construction was defective or the architect's plans were defec-
tive, or both. This was held to be a misjoinder of causes and parties, involving
separate claims on separate contracts, there being no privity or community of in-
terest between contractor and architect. If the changes proposed in this article are
adopted, the result of this case would probably be changed.
" Spruill v. Bank of Plymouth, 163 N. C. 43, 79 S. E. 262 (1913). It is not
stated that a formal cross-claim was made, though probably there was; and the
bank's theory was pretty clearly one of recovery over in case of loss to plain-
tiff. If there was no demand for relief, the third-party defendant could not be
held in the case, under the rule of the cases cited inrfra note 99. However, the
decision was not rested on this, but on the fact that he -was, at most, a proper
party and hence the ruling below was discretionary and not reviewable; and, be-
sides, the appeal was premature. Cf. the cases cited supra note 83. The court
said also that it was doubtful if he was a proper party, because the bank could
recover from him only if it bad paid the check wrongfully, which it denied in its
answer. As to this, there is no more reason here for denying the right to cross-
claim on a contingent basis than there is in the tort-feasor cases, in which it is
clearly allowed. See note 82 supra.
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claim of liability to the third-party plaintiff, unless the plaintiff could, by
timely action, have asserted rights against him. Possibly, though that
factor is lacking, he may be brought in if he is directly connected with
the transaction on which plaintiff's cause is grounded.90
Against this background, the Federal Rules can be examined. Rule
14(a) provides that a defendant may move for leave, as a third-party
plaintiff, to bring in a person "who is or may be liable to him.., for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him .... -91 The Rule does
not repeat the provision of Rule 13(g), dealing with cross-claims be-
tween original defendants, that any claim is proper if it arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint.
A distinction is thus drawn between the two situations. For example,
when A sues B and C for negligent injury, B may cross-claim against
C for B's injuries sustained in the same accident; but if A sues B alone,
B may not have C brought in for the sole purpose of asserting B's per-
sonal injury claim against him.
9 -2
Thus, the third-party practice is deliberately more limited in scope.
It is not required, however, that the third-party defendant's liability to
the third-party plaintiff be grounded upon the same theory as the latter's
liability to the plaintiff.
9 3
The basic provisions of Federal Rule 14 should be adopted in North
Carolina, including the.provision of Rule 14(b) that a plaintiff against
whom a counterclaim is asserted can bring in a new party under cir-
cumstances which would entitle a defendant to do so. 9"1
go See Smith v. Johnson, 209 N. C. 729, 184 S. E. 486 (1946). In an action
to establish a disputed boundary, defendant alleged that if the boundary was as
plaintiff contended, there had been a mutual mistake by defendant, plaintiff, and
their common grantor, who had given their deeds simultaneously after making
representations to both. Defendant had the common grantor brought in and asked
that the mistake be corrected and that, if plaintiff was successful, defendant re-
cover damages from the grantor for false representations. The court held that
the common grantor should be brought in for determination of the nljstake issue,
but the opinion is silent as to the propriety of the damage claim.
"As to third-party practice generally under the rule, see Note (1944) 148
A. L. R. 1182.
" However, it seems possible that if B brings in C on contingent allegations
that C is a joint tort-feasor liable for contribution to B, he might then add a
claim for his own injuries. The third-party defendant, under the terms of Rule
14(a), may assert such a claim against a third-party plaintiff.
" O'Neill v. American Export Lines, Inc., 5 F. R. D. 182 (S. D. N. Y. 1946)
(in suit for personal injuries caused by defective ladder, defendant brings in X
for breach of contract in furnishing defective ladder, and X, in turn, brings in Y
for breach of contract in furnishing defective chain for ladder); Jeub v. BIG
Foods, Inc., 2 F. R. D. 238 (D. Minn. 1942) (restaurant owner, sued for dam-
ages for selling contaminated food, brings in his vendor); Saunders v. Southern
Dairies, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 150 (D. D. C. 1939) (candy manufacturer, sued for neg-
ligence, brings in vendor who sold him the nuts containing the stone which caused
the injury). In some cases in which third-party defendants are impleaded as
indemnitors, the court will stay execution on the judgment against third-party
defendant until third-party plaintiff has paid the judgment of plaintiff against him.
Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Jeub v. B/G
Foods, Inc., supra.
" See section 7 (subsec. 5 of revised G. S. 1-137) of the proposed statute, infra
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The substance of Rule 14's provisions governing the pleading
rights of the third-party defendant once brought in, should likewise be
adoptedY However, several changes from the present version of the
Rule should be made.
(1) In deference to long-established North Carolina practice in
accident cases, a proviso should be added to the effect that the new
provisions do not enlarge the right of an insured to make his insurer
a third-party defendant.9 6
(2) In drafting the proposed statute, the model has been Rule 14(a)
as it will appear if the amendments now pending become operative,
rather than the rule as it currently appears. The changes are primarily
clarifications, rather than changes of fundamental character, 97 and in
only one respect is discussion called for here. The present rule pur-
ports to authorize an original defendant to bring in a third-party de-
fendant on allegations that the latter is or may be liable to plaintiff.
Thus it ostensibly authorizes joinder of a party against whom neither
plaintiff nor defendant is demanding relief. The federal courts have
not been inclined to hold the third-party defendant in the case under
such circumstances,9 8 and the amendments would eliminate the provi-
sion. A similar result has been reached in the tort-f easor cases in North
Carolina. Our court has held that to hold the third-party defendant
in the case the third-party plaintiff must ask for judgment against him;
it is insufficient to allege simply that he is liable to the plaintiff. 99
note 107. Under present North Carolina practice the rights of a plaintiff are
probably co-extensive with those of a defendant in this respect. See, for instance,
Bost v. Metcalfe, cited supra note 71, where third-party defendant was brought
in by plaintiff in connection with the latter's answer to a counterclaim. He was
dismissed, but only because he and plaintiff could not be joint tort-feasors; and
the court did not suggest there was any impropriety in the procedure followed.
"' See sections 7 (subsec. 5 of revised G. S. 1-137) and 9 of the proposed statute,
infra note 107. One feature is that a third-party defendant can become a third-
party plaintiff and bring in a second third-party defendant. Followed in Q'Neill
v. American Export Lines, Inc., cited supra note 93.
"6 See section 7 (subsec. 6 of revised G. S. 1-137) of the proposed statute,
infra note 107. While the matter may be subject to some uncertainty, the language
of Rule 14(a), permitting joinder of a third-party defendant who "may be' liable
to third-party plaintiff, seems broad enough to authorize an insured to bring in his
insurer, at least unless the federal court feels obligated to follow contrary state
policy. See Jordan v. Stephens, 9 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a.221, Case No. 1 (D. C.
Mo., 1945)'; Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413 (D. Md., 1939). Cf. Pitcairn v.
Rumsey and Jennings v. Beach, both cited supra note 24. The power to bring in
an indemnitor has been recognized. Burris v. American Chicle Co., cited supra
note 93. Cf. Lackey v. Southern Ry., cited supra note 82, indicating that the
North Carolina rule is to the contrary as to contracts of strict indemnity, as
there is no breach of the contract prior to recovery against the indemnitee.
"' They are explained in the report cited supra note 41, note to Rule 14.
"8 Report cited supra note 41, cases cited in note to Rule 14. "The committee's
reasoning and understanding of the weight of authority upon the present rule
appear to this court to be unassailable' Bull v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 6
F. R. D. 7, 10 (D. Neb., 1946).
"o Walker v. Loyall, 210 N. C. 466, 187 S. E. 565 (1936) ; Bargeon v. Seashore
Transportation Co., 196 N. C. 776, 147 S. E. 299 (1929). See also Perry v. Sikes,
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Finally, with reference to cross-claims and third-party claims, if at-
tempting to settle them at the same time as plaintiff's claim is settled
would actually prejudice the plaintiff, the court will have ample power
to order separate trials.'O°
OTHER NEW PARTIES TO COUNTERCLAIMS OR CROSS-CLAIMS
Federal Rule 13(h) provides: "When the presence of parties other
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court
shall order them to be brought in as defendants . . . if jurisdiction of
them can be obtained. . . ."101 Very possibly the object of this rule
could be accomplished without any change in the North Carolina stat-
utes, as G. S. 1-73 provides: "when a complete determination of the
controversy cannot be made without the presence of other parties, the
court must cause them to be brought in." The use of "controversy,"
instead of "plaintiff's cause of action," is broad enough to include claims
made by a defendant; and a defendant has been allowed to bring in a
new party on a counterclaim.10 2  However, since the proposed changes
would broaden the defendant's counterclaim and cross-claim priviliges,
it can do no harm to include the substance of Rule 13(h) in our statute,
so that the legislative purpose in this respect will be clear.
10 3
MISCELLANEOUS
In effecting the changes already proposed a few implementing
changes are necessary. These have to do with the filing of replies and
cited supra note 69; Coulter v. Wilson, cited supra note 71; Lamson Co., Inc. v.
Morehead, cited supra note 88. Presumably, if the third-party defendant is actually
brought in and the plaintiff amends to state a cause of action against him, he will
be retained, though no claim for relief is made by the third-party plaintiff. Allow-
ance of such an amendment would probably be discretionary. See Speas v. City
of Greensboro, 204 N. C. 239, 167 S. E. 807 (1933).
0 See section 12 of the proposed statute, infra note 107.
l Followed in: Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A.
2d, 1944) ("co-conspirators" of plaintiff brought in) ; U. S. v. Skilken, 53 F. Supp.
14 (N. D. Ohio 1943) (plaintiff's bondsman). A subsequent appeal in the Lesnik
case, 153 F. (2d) 783 (1946), indicates that it is sufficient if the new parties are
joint tort-feasors with plaintiff, actual conspiracy being unnecessary. See also
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) §13.09.
.0. Owen v. Salvation Army, Inc., 198 N. C. 610, 152 S. E. 800 (1930). Plain-
tiff's surety was brought in on a counterclaim. Decision dealt with whether coun-
terclaim stated cause of action, rather than propriety of the procedure, which was
apparently assumed. Cf. Griffin & Vose, Inc. v. Non-Metallic Minerals Corp., 225
N. C. 434, 35 S. E. (2d) 247 (1945) ; State ex rel. Jones v. Griggs, 219 N. C. 700,
14 S. E. (2d) 836 (1941) ; Hood v. Burrus, 207 N. C. 560, 178 S. E. 362 (1935) ;
Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., cited supra notes 71 and 88;
Maxwell v. Barringer, 110 N. C. 76, 14 S. E. 516 (1892); State ex rel. Carr v.
Askew, 94 N. C. 194 (1886) (where what the court did was tantamount to making
plaintiff administratrix a party in her individual capacity for determination of a
"retainer in the nature of set-off" pleaded by defendant) ; McKesson v. Menden-
hall, 64 N. C. 286 (1870).
' See section 7 (subsec. 4 of revised G. S. 1-137) of the proposed statute, infra
note 107.
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of answers to cross-claims, 10 4 with demurrers to various pleadings,105
and with clarification, in the light of the pleadings which will be per-
missible, of the rules as to when responsive pleadings are required and
when allegations not denied are deemed admitted. 0 6 Detailed discussion
of these changes is unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Adoption of these changes, which are incorporated in the amending
statute herewith submitted, would ground North Carolina's joinder
provisions on the realistic basis of trial convenience, and, in this respect,
would place the State in line with the modern trend of procedural re-
form. Obviously, cases dealing with joinder would not be eliminated,
as questions of interpretation lurk in every statute. But it is reasonable
to suppose that, after an initial burst of cases designed to ascertain the
court's attitude toward the new provisions, the number of joinder cases
reaching the Supreme Court would decline. This would be true because
the new provisions would eliminate current restrictions which are illog-
ical and arbitrary. Thus, by comparison to the present law, they would
clearly permit joinder in a much higher percentage of the cases where
common sense renders it desirable and attorneys, therefore, seek to
secure it. At the same time, the power to order separate trials would
stand as a continuing safeguard against real prejudice, against unwar-
ranted confusion, and against unreasonable delay of decision as to any
phase of a case warranting preference as to time of trial.
Further, the new provisions, and particularly the modification of
the rule requiring dismissal for misjoinder of causes and parties would
tend to eliminate some of the present delays. Attorneys would be more
likely to confine attacks on joinder to cases in which real prejudice is
feared, since the prize of dismissal ceases to be an automatic reward.
Thus another step would be taken toward elimination of those unfor-
tunate technicalities which, however much they may appeal to an indi-
vidual layman in the case he wins, are the basis for the soundest and
most persistent lay criticisms of court procedure.
0 7
1o' See sections 8 and 9 of the proposed statute, infka note 107.
... See section 10 of the proposed statute, infra note 107.
108 See sections 8 and 11 of the proposed statute, infra note 107.
""7A Bill to be Entitled an Act to Revise the Statutes Governing the Permis-
sive Joinder of Parties and Causes of Action in Civil Cases.
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact:
Sec. 1. Section 1-68 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby stricken
out and the following substituted therefor: "Sec. 1-68. Who -may be plaintiffs.
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief,
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same
subject of action or the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in
the action. A plaintiff need not be interested in obtaining all the relief demanded."
Sec. 2. Section 1-69 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby stricken
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out and the following substituted therefor: "Sec. 1-69. Who may be defendants.
1. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them, jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect
of or arising out of the same subject of action or the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact com-
mon to all of them will arise in the action. A defendant need not be interested in
defending against all the relief demanded.
"2. In an action to recover the possession of real estate, the landlord and tenant
may be joined as defendants. Any person claiming title or right of possession to
real estate may be made a party plaintiff or defendant, as the case requires, in
such action."
Sec. 3. Section 1-123 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby amended
by striking out all of said section except the last paragraph thereof and substi-
tuting for the part so stricken out the following: "Sec. 1-123. What causes of
action may be joined. The plaintiff in his complaint may join, either as independent
or alternate claims, and whether consistent or inconsistent, as many causes of
action either legal or equitable or both as he may have against a defendant. There
may be a like joinder of causes of action where there are multiple parties if the
requirements of sections 1-68 and 1-69 are satisfied. Causes of action so joined
should be separately stated.
"If causes of action which require different places of trial are joined, the court
shall, upon demand by the defendant at the time and in the manner prescribed by
section 1-83, divide the action and transfer such parts thereof as may require
trial elsewhere to the proper county or counties."
Sec. 4. Section 1-127 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which enumerates
the grounds for demurrer, is 'hereby amended by striking out the following: "5.
Several causes of action have been improperly united; or," and substituting there-
for the following: "5. There is a misjoinder of both parties and causes of action;
or,"
Sec. 5. Section 1-132 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby stricken
out and the following substituted therefor: "Sec. 1-132. Division of actions for
misjoinder. If the demurrer is sustained because of misjoinder of parties and causes
of action, the judge shall, upon such terms as are just, divide the action or order
the offending pleader to do so. If the division made by a pleader fails to correct the
misjoinder, or if, within the time limited by the judge, the pleader fails to effect a
division, the judge may, in his discretion, divide or dismiss such part of the action
as still involves a misjoinder of parties and causes of action."
Sec. 6. Section 1-135 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, dealing with the
contents of answers, is hereby amended by striking out the last paragraph thereof
and substituting therefor the following: "2. A statement, in ordinary and concise
language, without repetition, of any new matter constituting a defense, counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim."
Sec. 7. Section 1-137 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby stricken
out and the following substituted therefor: "Sec. 1-137. Counterclaims, cross-
claims, and Third-Party Claims. 1. Compulsory counterclaims. The answer shall
state as a counterclaim any claim which, at the time the answer is filed, the de-
fendant has against a plaintiff, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim, unless: (a) it requires for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court canndt acquire juris-
diction; or (b) the court in which the action is pending would not have jurisdiction
to grant the full relief which could be sought by the counterclaim; or (c) the
claim, at the time plaintiff's action was commenced, was the subject of another
pending action. Any such claim which does not mature or exist in defendant's
favor until after the answer is filed may, with the permission of the court, be set
forth as a counterclaim in a supplemental answer.
"2. Permissive counterclaims. The answer may state as a counterclaim any
claim which, at the time the answer is filed, the defendant has against a plaintiff,
not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim. Any such claim acquired or maturing after answer is filed may,
with the permission of the court, be set forth as a counterclaim in a supplemental
answer.
"3. Cross-claims. The answer may state as a cross-claim any claim against a
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co-defendant arising out of a transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to the subject matter
of the original action; or a claim that the co-defendant is or may be liable to the
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted against the cross-claimant by
another party to the action. There may be similar cross-claims between plaintiffs.
"4. New parties on counterclaim or cross-claim. When the presence of addi-
tional parties is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination
of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants if jurisdiction of them can be acquired.
"5. Third-party claims. Before the filing of his answer a defendant may move
ex parte or, after the filing of his answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a
third-party plaintiff to bring in a person not a party to the action who is or may
be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion
is granted, such person, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall be served
with summons, the complaint, and defendant's answer containing the third-party
claim. The third-party defendant shall demur or answer and assert as a counter-
claim any claim which, at the time the third-party answer is filed, he has against
the third-party plaintiff, arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the third-party claim, in the manner and within the time pre-
scribed for defendant's pleading to complaints; and -he may, in his answer, cross-
claim against other third-party defendants in the manner prescribed for cross-
claims between defendants. He may in his answer assert against the plaintiff any
defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim; and may also
assert against the plaintiff, as a counterclaim in his answer, any claim arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may, by amendment to the com-
plaint, assert against the third-party defendant any claims arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the
third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant shall thereupon assert in his
answer his defenses, counterclaims and cross-claims in the same manner as if he
had been an original defendant. A third-party defendant may proceed under this
subsection against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to
him for all or part of the claim made in the action against him.
"When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party
to be brought in under circumstances which under this subsection would entitle
a defendant to do so.
"6. Insured and insurer. Nothing in this section shall be construed to enlarge
the right of an insured to have his insurer made a party to an action."
Sec. 8. Section 1-140 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby stricken
out and the following substituted therefor: "Sec. 1-140. Replies to counterclaims
and answers to cross-claims. If an answer or third-party answer contains a counter-
claim or cross-claim it shall be served upon the party or parties against- whom
relief is sought or upon their attorneys of record. A party so served shall have
twenty (20) days after service within which to demur or reply to such counter-
claim or demur or answer to such cross-claim: Provided, for good cause shown
the clerk or judge may extend the time for filing such reply or answer to a day
certain. If the pleading containing the counterclaim or cross-claim is not served
as above provided, such counterclaim or cross-claim shall, in the absence of a reply
or answer thereto voluntarily filed, be deemed fully denied or avoided, as the case
may require."
Sec. 9. Section 1-141 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby stricken
out and the following substituted therefor: "See. 1-141. Contents of replies and
of answers to cross-claims and third-party claims. A reply, or an answer to a
cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain admissions, denials and affirmative
defenses in accordance with the rules prescribed for answers to complaints. A
reply to a counterclaim in an answer or third-party answer shall also plead as a
counterclaim any claim which, at the time of filing such reply, the pleader has
against the opposing pleader, arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the counterclaim to which the reply is made, subject to the
rules prescribed for compulsory counterclaims to complaints. Counterclaims in
third-party answers are to be pleaded in accordance with the provisions of sub-
section 5 of section 1-137."
Sec. 10. Section 1-142 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby stricken
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out and the following substituted therefor: "Sec. 1-142. Pleadings required and
allowed; demurrers to pleadings other than complaints. 1. There shall be a com-
plaint; an answer; an answer to a cross-claim or third-party claim properly served;
and a reply to a counterclaim contained in an answer or third-party answer prop-
erly served. There may be a voluntary answer to a cross-claim or third-party
claim not properly served, or a voluntary reply to an answer, to a third-party
answer, to an answer to a cross-claim, or to a counterclaim in a reply, but it shall
not be permitted to delay trial of the action. Upon motion, in his discretion, the
judge may order a reply to an affirmative defense in an answer or third-party
answer or answer to a cross-claim, or may order a reply to a counterclaim in a
reply; and such order shall state the time within which the reply is to be filed.
No other pleadings shall be allowed.
"2. A plaintiff may demur to an answer containing new matter when, upon
its face, it does not constitute a counterclaim or defense; and he may demur to
one or more of such counterclaims or defenses and reply to the residue. In like
manner, the party against whom it is directed may demur to a cross-claim, a third-
party claim, a reply, a third-party answer, or an answer to a cross-claim. Such
demurrers shall specifically state the grounds therefor and shall be heard and
determined as prescribed for demurrers to complaints."
Sec. 11. Section 1-159 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is hereby stricken
out and the following substituted therefor: "Sec. 1-159. Allegations deemed ad-
initted or controverted. Every material allegation of any part of a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is required, or to which a responsive pleading is filed,
not controverted by such responsive pleading is, for purposes of the action, taken
as true. Material allegations in any part of a pleading to which no responsive
pleading is required, and to which no responsive pleading is filed, shall be deemed
controverted by the adverse party as upon a direct denial or avoidance, as the
case may require."
Sec. 12. Section 1-179 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, dealing with
separate trials, is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
"The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice or unnecessary ex-
pense or delay to any party, or to avoid confusion of issues, may order a separate
trial of any cause of action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim, or issue,
or of any number of causes of action, counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party
claims, or issues, or may make such other orders as justice may require."
Sec. 13. Section 1-124 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, dealing with
defendants' pleadings, is hereby amended by inserting at the beginning thereof, to
become a part of the first sentence, the following: "Except as provided in sections
1-140, 1-141 and 1-142."
Sec. 14. All laws and clauses of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act
are hereby repealed.
Sec. 15. This act shall take effect on : Provided, that if, in the
opinion of the court, its application to any particular action then pending would
not be feasible or would work injustice, it shall not apply to that action, which
shall then be governed by the procedure theretofore existing.
Norn: The foregoing bill was introduced in the 1947 legislature by Senator
William C. Medford of Haywood as Senate Bill 133. It was referred to the Com-
mittee on Judiciary No. 2, where it died.
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